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Omitted-Ability Bias and the 
Increase in the Return to Schooling 
McKinley L. Blackburn, Umverslty of South Carolma 
David N eumark, Umverszty of Pennsylvama and 
N atlOnal Bureau of EconomIc Research 
Over the 1980s, there were sharp increases in the return to schooling 
estimated with conventional wage regressions. We explore whether 
the relationship between ability and schooling changed over this period 
in ways that would have increased the schooling coefficient in these 
regressions. Our empirical results reject the hypothesis that an increase 
in the bias of the schooling coefficient, due to a change in the rela-
tIOnship between ability and schoolmg, has contributed to observed 
increases in the return to schooling. We also find that the increase in 
the schoolmg return has occurred for workers with relatively high 
levels of academic ability. 
I. Introduction 
In the 1980s, the United States experienced considerable changes m the 
structure of wages paid to different demographic and educational groups. 
The most notable of these changes is a large increase in wage differences 
of white males at different educational levels, as the wages of more-educated 
workers increased relative to their less-educated counterparts. For instance, 
among white males between the ages of 25 and 34 in 1979, college graduates 
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versity for helpful comments. Sadiq Currimbhoy provided excellent research as-
sistance. 
[Journal of Labor EconomIcs, 1993,vol II,no 3] 
© 1993 by The University of Chicago All nghts reserved 
0734-306X/93/II03-0003$01.50 
521 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
522 Blackburn/Neumark 
earned roughly 15% more than workers who had only completed high 
school; among 25-34-year-olds in 1987, college graduates earned 33% more 
than high-school graduates.! Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990/91) 
show that wage differences associated with education also increased for 
white females, while Katz and Revenga (1989) also point to Increases in 
the 1980s in wage differences associated with the level of labor market 
experience of white males. 
Several studies have attempted to explain why education-related wage 
differentials increased In the 1980s. Perhaps the most commonly offered 
explanations have been associated with changes in the relative demand for 
workers at different educational levels. For example, it has been suggested 
that changes in international trade patterns have shifted relative labor de-
mand curves in favor of the more educated. An associated explanation 
singles out shifts in the industrial structure of the economy toward servlce-
oriented production as the important factor. However, the available evi-
dence suggests that these changes have at most played a minor role In the 
changes in earnings differentials. There is also evidence that changes in 
the supply of workers at different educational levels have contributed to 
the changes in earnings differentials, especially for younger white males, 
though the magnitude of this effect is sensitive to assumptions about the 
substitutability between more and less educated workers. An alternative 
explanation (discussed in Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman [1990)) is that 
there are changes in the average level of productive ability of workers in 
different educational classes.2 
There are several economic theories that suggest there might be a rela-
tionship between a worker's inherent ability (i.e., ability not affected by 
acquisition of schoolIng) and his level of schooling. In the following section, 
we discuss two such theories-a signaling model and a human-capital 
model. We also argue that it is possible that changes over time in the 
schooling-ability relationship have played a role in Increasing the observed 
return to schooling. In particular, we suggest that an increase In the cor-
relation between ability and schooling among cohorts entering the labor 
market could have caused an increase in the return to education without 
a corresponding increase In the "true" effect of schooling on wages. Al-
ternatively, an Increase in the price of ability could also lead to a SpUrIOUS 
increase in the estimated return to schooling. Since most empirical studies 
of the increase in the return to schooling do not attempt to control for the 
I These statistIcs are taken from table 1 of Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 
(1990). Similar findings are reported m, e.g., Katz and Revenga (1989). 
2 Kosters (1991, p. 16) suggests that "given the growmg fractIon of young people 
completmg at least some college, those completing only high school might not be 
as able as ear Iter generatIons of students." 
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effect of unobserved ability on wages, estimates of the increase in schoollllg 
returns could reflect a change in the schooling-ability relationship. 
At the outset, we want to emphasize that changes in the relationshlp 
between ability and schooling can constitute only a partial explanation of 
recent changes in education-earnings differentials. This follows from the 
fact that these differentials have increased for older as well as younger 
workers, while changes in the ability-schooling relationship are most di-
rectly related to changes in the return to schooling for cohorts of workers 
entering the labor market. However, studies of recent changes in education-
earnings differentials have generally found that increases III these differ-
entials have been considerably larger among cohorts of workers Just en-
tering the labor market than among all prime-age workers. For example, 
Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990) report that the increase in the 
college /high-school differential from 1979 to 1987 for 25-34-year-olds 
was almost double the increase observed for the complete sample of 25-
64-year-olds. Katz and Murphy (1992) report a similar difference when 
comparing workers with 1-5 years of experience to workers at all expe-
rience levels. It is this additional increase in educational returns for the 
youngest workers (approxlmately half of the total increase) that we consider 
potentially explainable by changes in the schooling-abllity relationship.3 
But is it possible that the schooling-ability relationship could have 
changed sufficiently over an 8-year period so as to cause such a large 
increase in the observed return to education? This is in essence an empirical 
question, though there is some eVldence suggesting that ability distributions 
(as reflected in test scores), as well as the ability-schooling relations hlp, 
should not be thought of as stable over time. For one, Bishop (1989) 
reports a large decline in the average score on basic-skills tests administered 
to students in Iowa (and similar tests in other states) that he argues is 
partially responsible for the fall in the rate of productivity growth. More 
important, Taubman and Wales (1972) present eVldence from several stud-
ies that suggest that the difference III average test scores between students 
who contillue their education after completing high school and those who 
do not Illcreased almost fivefold from 1925 to 1960. Whlle we are not 
aware of any evidence on changes in the relationship between test scores 
and schooling among cohorts entering the labor market in the 1980s (prior 
to this study), past evidence suggests that the possibility of such changes 
deserves attentlOn. 
3 Pnor research has suggested that the larger Increase in dIfferentials for younger 
workers is due to the fact that supply changes have been more rapId for this group 
than for prIme-age workers as a whole. However, estimates of the Importance of 
this explanation depend on assumptions about the substItutability between college 
and high-school workers (see Katz and Murphy 1992) Research emphaSIzing this 
explanation has also generally Ignored substitution possibIlItIes between younger 
and older workers of the same education level. 
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The empirical work in th1s article uses a sample of young wh1te males 
from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) Youth Cohort. We use data 
on these mdividuals to estimate wage equations that attempt to control 
for (among other things) the effect of both schooling and "unobserved 
ability" on wages. The models we estimate take advantage of scores on 
several tests measuring academic (or cognitive) and technical ability that 
are ava1lable in the Youth Cohort data. These test scores are used as (po-
tentially error-prone) measures of abilIty in wage equations. We also con-
sider econometric problems that arise from the potential endogeneity of 
schooling choices with respect to wages for young workers. 
Our empirical findings provide little or no support for the idea that 
changes in the relationship between ability and schooling in the 1980s are 
responsible for the increase in education-related earnings d1fferentials. In 
fact, our results suggest that the correlation between abIlity and schooling 
fell over this period. However, we do find evidence that the increase in 
earnings d1fferentials has occurred primarily for workers with higher ac-
ademic ability. 
II. Theoretical Discussion of the 
Ability-Schooling Relationship 
In this section, we consider the effect that the relationship between 
omitted ability and schooling has on empirical estimates of the relationship 
between education and earlllngs and how changes m the abilIty-schooling 
relationship may change the estimated relatlonship between education and 
earnings. We assume a model for earnings that follows the form 
(1) 
where w is the log of the wage, S is an educatlon variable, A is an ability 
variable, and E is an error term distributed independently of S and A.4 
Since A 1S not observed in the data sets used in recent studies of changes 
in the return to schooling, these studies have used the slmple-regression 
coefficient bws as an estimate for ~I (1.e., they estimate [1] omitting ability 
from the regression). This is a biased estimate, if A and S are correlated. 
In this sectlon, we discuss two kmds of models that suggest a positive 
relationship between ability and schooling: the slgnaling model and a vari-
ant of the usual human capital model. 
In slmple signaling models, h1gh-ability workers obtain more schooling 
than low-ability workers because schooling provides a signal to employers 
that they have high levels of ability (e.g., see Spence 1973). In a signaling 
4 The wage equatIon can be thought of as the partial relation of W w1th Sand 
A, the correlatIon of other vanables WIth w, S, and A havtng been removed. 
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model in which ability is a continuous variable, but the schooling signal 
is dichotomous (such as college versus no college), changes in the per-
centage of workers who obtain schooling should be associated with changes 
m the wage differential between educated and noneducated workers since 
the expected level of abilIty for educated and noneducated workers WIll 
be affected. 5 In particular, an increase m the percentage of workers who 
obtain the schooling signal is likely to be associated with a decline in the 
wage differential (if educated workers remam a minority of workers after 
this mcrease). 
Among 25-64-year-olds, the percentage of men who are college graduates 
increased from 1979 to 1987, while the wage dIfferential between college 
graduates and all other workers also mcreased. Since college graduates 
remained a minority of workers, an increase in this wage differential is the 
opposIte of what the signaling model would predIct. With more than two 
levels of schooling, however, simple predictions are not possible. In Black-
burn and N eumark (1991), we performed simulations of the effects that 
observed changes in the percentages of workers in a four-way education 
classification would be expected to have on wage differentials. Though the 
percentage of workers who were college graduates did fall from 1979 to 
1987 among 25-34-year-olds, these simulations suggested that a signaling 
model would imply associated changes in wage differentials that would 
be very small, and much smaller than the actual changes in observed wage 
differentials. Thus, it appears that a signaling model cannot explam the 
increased return to schooling in the 1980s as a consequence of a change 
in the ability-schooling relatIonship. 
A positive correlation between schooling and abtlity is also suggested 
by the human capItal model of Becker (1975). In this model, abtlity in-
creases the marginal benefit to an mdividual of acquiring schooling, while 
"opportunity" reflects individual differences that lower the marginal cost 
of schooling. Unless there is a sufficiently large negative correlation between 
ability and opportUnIty, the model predicts that those workers who choose 
more schooling wtll also tend to have hIgher levels of ability. Failure to 
control for ability in a wage regreSSIOn should result in upward-biased 
estimates of the return to schoolmg.6 
The Becker model can be used to consIder the effect that changes in the 
distrIbution of ability and opportunIty would have on the bias in the 
schooling coeffiCIent estimates from wage regressions that omitted ability. 
5 The model assumes that the mean and variance of the abIlIty dIstnbution IS 
stable over tIme. The model is presented In Blackburn and Neumark (1991) 
6 In thIS model, a worker's level of opportUnIty does affect theIr choice of school-
Ing but does not otherWIse affect the wage they expect to receive. Therefore, omIssion 
of measures of opportunIty In the wage regressIOn does not lead to addltJonal bIas 
In the schooling coeffiCIent estimate. 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
526 Blackburn IN eumark 
For instance, increases in the variance of ability, or in the size of the co-
variance between ability and opportunity, should increase this omitted-
ability bias. Likewise, decreases in the variation in opportunity across in-
dividuals would also increase this bias.7 Smce we know little about how 
ability I opportunity distributions have been changing in recent years, It is 
difficult to speculate on whether changes in this bias are likely. However, 
these results suggest that attempting to control for ability in wage regression 
estimates of the schooling-return increase is important. In the following 
section, we estimate wage models that use test scores as potential indicators 
of ability usually not captured in standard wage regressions. With these 
estimates, we can explore whether omission of ability has been important 
to the large increase in education-earnings differentials among young male 
workers. 
III. Empirical Analysis 
A. Data 
The data we use come from the National Longitudinal Survey Youth 
(NLSY) Cohort. This cohort was first surveyed in 1979, when the re-
spondents were between the ages of 14 and 22. They have been reinter-
viewed each year smce 1979; we use data through the 1987 interview. The 
information extracted for each year includes wages on the current Job, 
schooling status, labor market activity over the previous year, and industry, 
occupation, and union coverage on the current job. The 1979 interview 
also collected several variables associated with the famlly background of 
the respondent, which we use in our empirical analysis. 
Most importantly, the data set includes scores of each respondent on 
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASV AB) tests. Ten test 
scores are available, for a variety of cognitive and mechanical aptitudes. 
The test areas are general science, arithmetic reasoning, mathematics 
knowledge, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mechanical 
comprehension, numerical operations, electronic mformatlon, auto and 
shop informatlOn, and coding speed. The ASV AB tests were administered 
to all survey respondents between the 1979 and 1980 surveys, with a 94% 
completion rate. The availability of these test scores, along with the time 
period over which the data were collected, make the NLSY a useful data 
set for studying changes in education-related earnings differentials for 
young males in the early 1980s and whether shifts in the ablllty-schooling 
relationship underlie these changes.8 
7 These results are demonstrated m Blackburn and N eumark ( 1991 ) 
8 The NLSY has also not suffered from sample attrition to the same degree as 
earlier longitudmal labor-market surveys; by 1987, roughly 90% of the origmal 
cohort was still respondmg to interview requests. 
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The NLSY data could be used in a vanety of ways to measure earnings 
differentials for young workers. One possibility is to estimate wage equa-
tions for each year from 1979 to 1987, using any respondent in the year 
who was working and was not in school.9 One problem with this type of 
analysIs is that the sample in the later years will be increasingly made up 
of workers more established in their labor market positions; learning models 
suggest that schooling may become less important for wages, and abilIty 
more important, as workers accumulate experience, 10 so that this analysis 
could confuse age (actually, experience) effects in the return to schooling 
with the desired period effects. To minimize this problem, we instead 
construct our sample so that we use only one wage for each respondent; 
the wage we choose IS the first wage available after the respondent has 
completed his schooling (i.e., the respondent does not return to school by 
the 1987 wave of the survey). With this sample, we also capture workers 
for whom the Increase in the return to schoolIng has been sharpest. The 
restriction to using only one wage per respondent makes it impractical to 
try to carry out an analysIs of bias in schooling coefficients in regressions 
estimated separately for each year from 1979 to 1987, so we allow our 
schoolIng coefficients to vary along a linear tIme trend over the 1979-87 
penod. 11 
Sample means and standard deviations for many of the vanables used 
in our wage-equation estimation are presented in the first column of table 
1. The average age of our sample of workers on their first postschooling 
job is fairly young, though the amount of labor-market experience (i.e., 
hours worked in year-equivalent units) shows that on average our re-
spondents had worked over 2 years before they enter the sample. (Much 
of this experience may have been obtaIned in jobs held while in school.) 
The educational-attaInment statistics for our sample show slightly lower 
average education levels than other estimates for this cohort, probably 
because some of the eventually more-educated members of this cohort are 
still in school in 1987. 
In column 2 of table 1, we report coefficient estimates from an individual-
level regression of some of the variables on a constant and a time trend. 
These estimates show how the composition of the sample changes as we 
9 Bishop (1991) uses a restricted version of this setup, in which coefficients In 
wage equatIOns are allowed to vary along a linear trend over the sample period. 
Also, he does not restnct the sample to indIVIduals who are out of school. 
10 See, e.g., Hams and Holmstrom (1982) and Farber and GIbbons (1990). Indeed, 
Farber and GIbbons denve a further restnctIon that returns to abIlity will Increase 
wIth expenence, while returns to schooling wIll remain constant. 
11 We restrict the analysis to white males, for whom we have 2,451 observations. 
We exclude the self-employed, farm laborers, and respondents reporting a wage 
lower than one-half of the federal minimum wage prevaIling in the year from 
which the observation IS drawn. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for First Postschooling 
Labor Market Observation 
Log wage 
Years of education 
High school graduate (12 years) 
College graduate (16 years) 
Expenencet 
Age 
Marned, spouse present 
Urban 
UnIOn 
Number of observatIOns 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Test scores (age-neutral):j: 
Academic test§ 
Technical testll 
ComputatIOnal test 
Nonacademic test-technical 
+ computational 
Mean 
1616 
( 451) 
12729 
(2449) 
423 
156 
2180 
(1.754) 
20975 
(2740) 
2,451 
463 
315 
309 
341 
287 
228 
185 
168 
155 
166 
710 
.176 
.012 
(.857) 
[- 61, .69] 
- 010 
( 840) 
[- 54, 61] 
010 
( 976) 
[-.65, 77] 
000 
(1 541) 
[- 91, 1.16] 
Trend' 
077 
( 003) 
558 
( 016) 
395 
( 012) 
685 
( 017) 
140 
( 006) 
065 
( 007) 
119 
( 008) 
184 
( 012) 
NOTE -Standard deviations are reported In parentheses 10 col Standard 
errors are reported In parentheses m col 2 
>I< CoeffiCIent from regressIOn on mtercept and time trend The time trend 
IS defined as zero In 1979 
t Actual year equIvalents of labor market experIence, constructed from weeks 
and hours worked In each year, and labor market history pnor to the first 
survey 10 1979 
:{: Residuals from regressions of normalized tcst scores on mdividual year 
age dummy vanables Lower and upper quartlles are reponed 10 square brackets 
§ Average of residuals for tests of anthmetH.., mathematIcs, word knowledge, 
paragraph comprehensIOn, and general SCIence 
II Average of residuals for tests of auto and shop knowledge, electronics, 
and mechanical knowledge 
move through the 1979-87 period. The wage variable we use is a measure 
of hourly earnings (in current dollars) on the primary Job held at the time 
of the interview; the trend coefficient shows that this wage has increased 
by almost 8% per year over the 1979-87 penod. While part of this increase 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
Return to Schooling 529 
is due to Inflation, the increase also reflects the fact that individuals in the 
later years have a higher average level of education, have more experience 
at the time of the first postschooling job observation, and are older at the 
time of the first job. Wages in the later years may also be higher because 
returns to education (and experience) increased over the period. 
Table 1 also reports sample statistics for averages of three subsets of the 
ASV AB test scores. Since the respondents were of different ages when the 
tests were administered, age effects were removed from the scores by re-
gressing each of the indiVIdual (normalized) test scores on a set of indi-
vidual-year age dummies (for all observations on white males for whom 
the test scores were available). The residuals from selected tests were then 
averaged to form the three composite test scores identified in table 1. Fol-
lOWing Bishop (1991), we dropped the coding speed test and classified 
the remaining tests as either academic, technical, or computational; details 
of this classification are provided in the footnotes to the table. Because our 
wage-equation estimates suggest that the technical and computational 
composites have very SImilar effects on wages, we also present sample 
statistics for the sum of these two composItes (the "nonacademIc" test). 
The trend coefficients for the test scores show that all three composites 
tend to be hIgher for those indIviduals whose first jobs were in the later 
years, with the increase over time largest for the academic test and smallest 
for the technical test. 
B. Wage Equation Estimates 
Using our hourly wage variable, we initially estimate equatlOns of the 
form 
where w is the log wage, S is years of schooling, T IS the value of the time 
trend for the year from which the observation is taken, X is a vector of 
other factors that affect the wage, Y is a set of year dummies, and E is an 
error term. The trend has a value of zero for the first year (1979) and 
increases by one for each subsequent year. Including year dummies 
effectively controls for variation in wages due to inflation, productivity 
growth, or other cyclIcal factors. The other variables Included In X are 
experience, age, a union membership dummy, a marriage dummy, and an 
urban dummy.12 
12 The ordInary least squares (OLS) estimates of trends In the coeffiCients of the 
marnage dummy and the urban dummy were near zero and statistically inSIgnificant, 
so in our reported estimates we constrained these trends to be zero. In contrast, 
the estimated trends In the coeffiCients for age and union membership were statIs-
tIcally SIgnificant and negatIve, and the estimated trend in experience was positive 
and nearly statIstIcally significant. Interactions of these variables with a time trend 
are Included In all specifications. 
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Ordinary least-squares estimates of 131 and 132 in equation (2) are reported 
in column 1 of table 2. The results replicate the increased return to schooling 
in this period found in other data sets. 13 The estimates suggest that the 
linear return to schooling was .032 in 1979 and that this coefficient has 
increased by .0034 in each follOWing year; by 1987, the estimate for the 
return to schooling is .059. This estimate for the Increase In the return to 
schooling is somewhat larger than estimates suggested by previous studies, 
though other studies have used samples of workers who are older and 
more established than the workers in our sample. 
To further explore the robustness of the Increased return to schooling 
in the NLSY, in the remaining columns of table 2 we include other edu-
cation-related variables as regressors to pick up nonlinear effects, while 
continuing to interact the years-of-education variable with a time trend. 
The linear specification could lead to incorrect inferences concerning the 
sign or magnitude of the increase In the return to schooling if the true 
relationship between schooling and log wages is nonlinear. This is poten-
tially a serious problem in analyzing our sample since the individuals whose 
first jobs are from the earlier years tend to be less educated than the in-
dividuals from the later years. For example, if the return were higher for 
college than for high-school years of education, our finding that the return 
to schooling is higher in the later years studied could entirely be due to 
the fact that individuals from the later years have more years of college 
education. 
In column 2 of table 2, we add years of college as an additional regressor; 
the estimates suggest the return to college years is higher than to precollege 
years, but including thiS variable only marginally reduces the education/ 
trend coefficient estimate. Including years of high school along with years 
of college (col. 3) reduces the education/trend coefficient estimate more 
and provides a statistically Significant negative coeffiCient for high-school 
years, relative to pre-high school years of education. In column 4 we 
include a college graduate dummy, and in column 5 we include both a 
high-school graduate and a college graduate dummy; estimates of both 
specifications continue to provide eVidence of an increased return to 
schooling. In sum, nonlinear effects of schooling on log wages, combined 
with the nature of our sample, may explain some of the large increase in 
the return to schooling suggested in column 1, but even after controlling 
for these effects, we continue to see a reasonably large rise in the schooling 
coefficient. 
IJ We also estImated separate wage equatIOns for each year, USIng our sample of 
first labor-market observatIons. The schoolIng coeffiCIent estImates are reported in 
App. table Al. These coefficients trend upward only approximately. However, we 
use the trend InteractIon to parametenze the model tIghtly, which IS particularly 
Important for the Instrumental variable (IV) estImation that follows. Also, thiS 
parallels specificatIons In related research (Bishop 1991) 
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Table 2 
OLS Log Wage Equation Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Years of education .032 .029 054 028 030 
(.007) (.008) ( 014) (.008) (.008) 
Years of education X trend .0034 0030 .0018 .0027 0023 
( 0017) ( 0017) ( 0018) (.0017) ( 0018) 
Years of high school -013 
( 006) 
Years of college 002 .001 
(.002) ( 002) 
High school graduate - 011 
( 017) 
College graduate 080 .075 
( 024) (.025) 
iP 393 393 394 .396 396 
NOTE -Specdicallons also mclude expenence, age, and umon status (each mteracted with a lIme trend 
defined as zero m 1979), dummy vanables for urban residence and mamed, spouse present, and an mtercept 
and smgle-year dummy van abIes Standard errors are reported m parentheses OLS ~ ordmary least 
squares 
As discussed in Section II, all of the schooling coefficient estimates in 
table 2, and in particular the education/trend coefficient estimate, poten-
tially suffer from biases resulting from the error term being partly composed 
of individual abilities not captured in X and from changes in the correlations 
between these abilities and schooling. In table 3, we attempt to provide 
some idea of the importance of omitted-abilIty bias by including our test 
score measures as proxies for this omitted ability. In column 1, we include 
the individual's academic, technical, and computational test scores as in-
dependent variables. As the coefficient estimates for the technical and 
computational tests are very close, and the coeffiCient estimate for the 
academic test is negative and statistically insignificant, we estimated a 
specification that excludes the academic test and includes the sum of the 
technical and computational tests; these results are in column 2. Both 
regressIOns provide highly significant coefficient estimates for the non-
academiC test scores, and inclusion of the test scores reduces the estimates 
for the schooling coefficient at any point in time (e.g., in col. 1 the coef-
ficient estimate for 1979 is .013 and for 1987 it is .051). However, the 
magnitude of the estimated increase in the schooling coefficient does not 
decline after including the test scores, but rather increases by nearly a third 
(.0048 in table 3, cols. 1 and 2, vs .. 0034 in table 2, col. 1) .14 
14 This result is due to the fact that, in our data set, the partial regreSSIOn coefficient 
In the aUXiliary regression of ability on schooling displays a statistically slgmficant 
negative trend for the test scores that we use. SpeCifically, we regressed the test 
scores on all of the vanables Included In the wage equation, including the educatlon/ 
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Table 3 
OLS and IV Log Wage Equation Estimates, Including Test Scores with Constant Coefficients 
IV for Test Scores 
OLS IV for Test Scores and SchoolIng IV for Schooling 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years of educatIOn 013 012 - 000 - 001 029 022 028 024 
(.008) ( 008) ( 013) ( 013) ( 045) (.043) (.021) ( 018) 
Years of educatlon X trend 0048 0048 0062 0057 0077 0062 0084 0070 
(.0017) ( 0017) ( 0023) ( 0018) ( 0047) (.0042) (.0029) ( 0030) 
AcademIC test - 010 -.057 -.110 - 042 
( 017) ( 152) ( 155) ( 024) 
Techmcal test 044 
( 013) 
ComputatIOnal test .041 
( 010) 
NonacademIC test 038 094 064 083 035 042 028 
(.006) ( 081) ( 020) ( 081) ( 044) ( 008) ( 009) 
IF 404 405 
Measurement error/ 
endogeneJty tests. 
p-value* 331 170 493 418 096 136 
NOTE -SpeUfilatiOm also Include expenence, age, and umon statm (each Interacted with a time trend defined a, zero In 1979), dummy vanables for urban residence and 
marned, spome present, and an Intercept and 'Ingle-vear dummy van able, Standard error, are reported In parenthe,e, imtrumental vanables are IlSled In App table A3 OLS 
= ordmary lea~t squares, IV = IJ}'itrumcntal vanable estlmatIon _ 
* p-valuc from F-tc<,:,t of <;Igmh<...ancc of coeffluents of residuab from hr<,:,t-stage Instrumental varIable',:, rcgre~"'lOn',:" In log wage equatIOn e~tImated with OLS 
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Simply Illcludlllg the test scores as regressors may not be the best way 
to use the information III these variables to control for "ability." It seems 
reasonable to expect that the productive ability that employers value is at 
least partly reflected in our test scores but that several other factors also 
affect the outcome of the tests (e.g., test-taking abilIty, sleep the previous 
mght, etc.). We might write this process as 
TS, = yA, + v,, 
where TS is the test score, A is ability rewarded in the labor market, and 
v is other factors that affect the test score. If we assume that A and v are 
uncorrelated, we have the claSSical errors-in-variables setup, suggestlllg 
that table 3's OLS estimates of the test score coefficients, and coefficients 
for variables correlated with the test scores, are Illconsistent. As a remedy, 
we assume that ability IS correlated with the family background of the 
Illdividual through the equation 
A, = AF, + 11, , 
where F is a vector of family-background variables. Instrumental variable 
estimation of the wage equation when the test score is included as a re-
gressor, using F as an instrument for TS, should elimlllate the inconsistency 
in the wage-equation estimates resulting from measurement error in the 
test scores. 15 
Schooling and test-score coefficient estimates from estimations in which 
the test scores are treated as error-ridden are presented III columns 3 and 
4 of table 3. The family-background variables used as instruments are lIsted 
III the Appendix table A3, along with the coefficient estimates III the first-
stage regressions for the test scores. 16 The wage-equation estimates show 
trend variable For the academIC test, the coefficient estImate (standard error) of 
this trend variable was -.010 (.003), whIle for the nonacademic test it was -.036 
(.006). We also looked at changes in the abIlity-schooling relationship on a year-
by-year baSIS, by regressing the test scores on education and the other varIables 
Included In the wage regressIon (omitting, In thIS case, the trend Interactions); the 
schooling coefficient estimates from the regressions for academIC and nonacademIc 
test scores are reported in App. table A2. 
15 We assume that F and lJ are uncorrelated. Prior research suggests that it IS 
reasonable to exclude famIly-background varIables as regressors In a wage equation 
(see the dIscussion In Blackburn and N eumark [1992]). This method for controlling 
for unobserved abIlIty was originally suggested by Gnhches and Mason (1972); 
see also the surveys In Gnhches (1977, 1979). 
16 For observatIons In whIch a famIly-background varIable IS miSSing, we set the 
variable to zero; we also include dummy vanables for each family-background 
variable being mIssing. This IS essentIally a first-order regressIOn method for handling 
mISSIng regressors. ThIS method IS likely to proVIde inconSIstent coefficient estimates 
(see Kmenta 1986), so the coefficient estimates we report in App. table A3 are 
hkely biased estImates of A. However, the inconSIstency in these estImates should 
not affect the consIstency of our estImates of the wage equatIon. 
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the estimate of the "ability" effect to be larger than without instrumenting, 
as would usually be expected if the OLS coefficients suffered from mea-
surement-error bias. The schooling coefficients also decline, for any given 
year, and appear to be essentially zero in the earliest years. But the Increase 
in the return to schooling is slightly larger as a result of instrumenting for 
the test scores, again suggesting that omitted ability plays no role in ex-
plaining increases in the return to schooling. We also performed specifi-
cation tests (suggested by Hausman [1978]) for the presence of measure-
ment-error bias in the ability coefficient; the probability values for the null 
hypothesis of no measurement-error bias are also reported in table 3. The 
specification tests do not provide strong evidence against the hypothesis 
that test scores are uncorrelated with the wage equation errors. 
Our IV estimates may also be inconsistent if the level of schooling IS 
not exogenous with respect to the postschooling wage. Models in which 
schooling decisions depend on the wage (e.g., human-capital models in 
which wages represent opportunity costs of schooling), or measurement 
error In the schooling variable (Griliches and Mason 1972), suggest that 
schooling may be correlated with the wage-equation error. Given the young 
age of the men in our sample, endogeneity is a potentially serious problem 
since the wages we observe are likely highly correlated with those relevant 
to their schooling decisions. To explore this possibility, we use our family-
background variables to instrument for both test scores and education; 
these results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of table 3. 17 This technique 
does affect the point estimates for the schooling and ability coefficients, 
but it also leads to a considerable increase in the standard errors aSSOCiated 
with these coefficients. Most importantly, the Increase in the return to 
schooling implied by the point estimates is even larger. Finally, if we in-
strument for schooling but not the test scores (cols. 7 and 8), we find 
pOint estimates for the test scores similar to those in columns 5 and 6; the 
estimated increase in the return to schooling is larger still and remains 
statistically significant. Hausman tests generally do not provide strong 
evidence against the joint hypotheSIS that both test scores and schooling 
are uncorrelated with the wage error term. However, the evidence against 
exogeneity is stronger when schooling is conSidered alone, with p-values 
of .096 (using both test scores) and .136 (using only the nonacademic 
test score). 
17 Rather than instrumentmg for the education/trend mteraction, we used the 
first-stage predicted value for education and mteracted It With the trend vanable 
m forming instruments since there IS no reason to expect the trend vanable to be 
correlated with the error term. This IS the method of ''internal mstruments" (Bowden 
and Turkmgton 1984). USing standard IV techniques (I.e., forming the interactions 
and then Instrumenting) yielded qualitatively Similar coefficient estimates, but 
standard errors that were often three or four times as large as those In table 3; this 
latter findmg parallels results in Bowden and Turkmgton 
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We were concerned that our results may be partially driven by the failure 
to adequately control for interactive effects among the determinants of the 
wage. For instance, there may be an mteraction between education and 
ability in wage equations; in particular, education may have a larger impact 
on the wages of more able workers. This may be particularly important 
given that, in our sample, individuals observed in the later years have both 
higher test scores and more schooling. 
The first column of table 4 presents estimates for the speCification in 
the second column of table 3 with an interaction between schooling and 
nonacademic ability as a regressor. 18 The estimated coefficient of the ed-
ucatIon/nonacademic test interaction is pOSitive and statistically significant 
and the education/trend coefficient estimate is reduced considerably. This 
result suggests that our findmg of an increase m the return to schooling 
may be partly due to a combination of an ability/education interactIve 
effect and the fact that average levels of ability are increasing over time in 
our sample. However, the estimates in columns 2 and 3 suggest that this 
interactive effect IS much less important if we allow the education/non-
academic test coefficient to vary over time and also add mteractIons of the 
nonacademic test score with age, experience and a trend. 19 For example, 
in column 3, the education coefficient estimate still displays an upward 
(although statistically insignificant) trend, though there IS also some (slight) 
eVidence that the education/nonacademic test coefficient is increasing 
over tIme. 
It IS not surprising that there is little evidence of an interactive effect of 
educatIon and nonacademic ability since there is no clear reason why non-
academic ability would be expected to increase the beneficial effects of 
educatIOn. In columns 4-6 of table 4, we repeat the estimations of columns 
1-3 usmg the academic test score in place of the nonacademic. Including 
an lllteraction between the academic test and education provides a signif-
ICant coefficient estimate for the lllteraction and leaves the estimated in-
crease in the schooling coefficient at essentially zero. This interactive effect 
of academic ability and schooling appears to be present primarily in the 
18 We estImated these specificatIons by OLS uSing the test scores as ability mea-
sures. Strictly speaking, thiS method of estImatIon IS supported by the Insigmficant 
Hausman test statIstics of table 3. USing different data, Blackburn and Neumark 
(1992) found that instrumenting was necessary when using an IQ test score, the 
difference In findings may be due to the ASV AB test scores being less error-prone 
than the IQ test scores in the other data. Below, however, we report results treating 
the test scores and schooling as correlated WIth the wage equatIon error 
19 To ease the Interpretation of the coeffiCients, we have defined the levels of 
educatIon, expenence, and age used In the interaction varIables as deviations from 
12,2, and 21, respectIvely (nearthe sample means) Thus, e.g, In col. 3 the Implied 
partIal denvative of log wages with respect to the nonacademiC test score, for an 
individual with 12 years of schooling, 2 years of experIence, and aged 21, IS Simply 
the coeffiCient on the test score (.052). 
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Table 4 
OLS Log Wage Equation Estimates, Alternative Trend and Interactive 
Specifications 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years of 
educatIOn 026 025 019 031 .029 025 .025 .023 
( 009) (.009) ( 009) ( 009) 
Years of 
( 009) ( 009) ( 009) ( 009) 
educatIOn 
X trend 0015 0015 0022 0001 -.0003 - 0001 - 0003 0004 
( 0018) (.0018) ( 0019) ( 0019) (.0020) ( 0021) ( 0021) ( 0020) 
NonacademIC 
test .038 036 052 067 061 
(.006) ( 006) ( 009) ( 016) ( 012) 
NonacademIc 
test X years 
of educatIOn 009 006 .002 005 
( 002) ( 003) ( 004) ( 007) 
NonacademIc 
test X years 
of education 
X trend .0008 0010 -.0005 
( 0008) ( 0008) (.0015) 
NonacademIc 
test X trend -.0041 - 0057 -.0037 
( 0028) ( 0050) (.0027) 
NonacademIc 
test 
X expenence - 005 - 002 
( 004) ( 006) 
NonacademIc 
test X age 010 006 006 
( 003) (.005) ( 003) 
AcademIc test 048 043 .058 - 043 - 021 
( 011) ( 012) (.020) (.032) (.017) 
AcademIC test 
X years of 
educatIOn 015 005 - 003 - 004 
( 004) (.007) ( 007) (.014) 
AcademIc test 
X years of 
educatIOn 
X trend 0029 0032 0034 0029 
( 0014) ( 0015) ( 0028) (.0010) 
AcademIC test 
X trend - 0022 0068 
( 0054) ( 0094) 
AcademIC test 
X expenence -.012 - 007 
(.007) ( 011) 
AcademIc test 
X age 019 009 009 
( 005) ( 009) ( 007) 
R' 409 409 411 402 403 405 413 414 
NOTe -SpccdicatlOns also mdudc experIence, age, and unton status (each Interacted WIth a time trend 
defined as zero In 1979), dummh' van abies for urban reSIdence and marned, spou~e present, and an intercept, 
and smgle-year dummy vana les Standard errors are reponed In parentheses OLS = ordmary least 
square~ 
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later years of our sample, as the estimate of the test-score/education/ 
trend coefficient is positive and statistically sigmficant in columns 5 and 
6.20 If we include all interactions for both the academic and nonacademic 
test scores in the same equation (col. 7), the academic test/educatlon/ 
trend coefficient estimate is still large but becomes statistically inSignificant 
because of a much higher standard error. In column 8, we exclude all 
variables with clearly insignificant coefficient estimates, leaving the aca-
demic test/education/trend coefficient estimate virtually unchanged but 
with a much smaller standard error. While any hypothesis testing associated 
with column 8 does suffer from pretest bias, the t-statistic of 2.9 is rather 
large. In addition, in both columns 7 and 8, an estimated increase In the 
coefficient on education is no longer present. 
Finally, the estimates reported in table 4 also contain some information 
on changes in the "price" of ability. As we noted earlier, increases in the 
price of abilIty, as well as a strengthened partial correlation between ability 
and schooling, could have generated increases in returns to schooling over 
the 1980s. The point estimates in column 8 of table 4 suggest that, if 
anything, the coefficient for the nonacademic test has been declining. The 
positive coeffiCient for the academic test/education/trend interaction is 
consistent with an increase in the return to abilIty for the more highly 
educated. However, there is no evidence of an across-the-board Increase 
in the price of academic ability; the coefficient estimates of the academic 
test/trend interaction In columns 6 and 7 are statistically Insignificant. 
Estimates of the coefficients Involving test-score / trend interactions may 
be biased toward zero. Because the NLSY respondents took the ASV AB 
tests in 1979 and 1980, It is possible that the test scores are more accurate 
indicators of abilIty for observations close to these years and nOisier in-
dicators for observations later in the sample period. This increase in mea-
surement error over the sample period could bias the results against finding 
an Increase In the "price" of ability. To shed some lIght on thiS problem, 
for each of the two test scores we estimated the wage equation specification 
from table 2, column 1, adding the test score and the test-score/trend 
interaction. We estimated these specifications first using OLS, and then 
instrumenting for the test-score variables. If the test scores for the later 
observations are more error-ridden, then the IV estimation should remove 
the bias In the estimates of the test-score/trend coefficients and result In 
higher point estimates than the OLS estimation (when the latter are pos-
itive). However, for both the nonacademic and academic test scores, the 
20 Krueger (1991) finds that the Increase in the return to schoolmg between 1984 
and 1989 was larger for individuals reporting use of a computer at work. SInce It 
seems plausible that these individuals have relatively high academiC ability, this 
result IS consistent With our findIng of a positive coeffiCient for the test-score / 
education trend. 
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IV estimate of the coefficient of the test-score/trend interactIon IS lower 
than the OLS estimate.21 Thus, we do not belIeve that this source of mea-
surement-error bias IS a serious problem. 
To summarize the findings from tables 3 and 4, the increase in the return 
to education over the 1980s persists when account is taken of the potential 
relationships between ability, schooling and wages. However, our inves-
tigation leads to a refinement of the finding: the increase in the return to 
education occurred for workers with relatively high academic ability. In 
fact, because the test scores are constructed to have means near zero, the 
estimates imply that most workers with below average academic ability 
experienced a decline in the return to schooling.22 Overall, then, existing 
estimates of the Increase in the return to schooling, from data sets without 
ability measures, overstate the relative wage gaInS that educatIOn would 
have imparted to a randomly chosen (or marginal) worker. 
C. Robustness Checks 
Several checks of the robustness of our findIngs are reported in table 5. 
In each case, the first two columns report the OLS estimate of the education 
coeffiCIent and its trend in specifications without ability controls. The next 
two columns report these coefficients' estimates from speCifications that 
Include the test-score interactions included in column 8 of table 4. We also 
report the academic test/education/trend coefficient estimate, and the 
estimate for the coefficient on the nonacademic test score. 
First, we conSider the effects of changes in the sample used in estimating 
the wage equations. We tried two alternative restrictions in selecting the 
sample. FIrSt, we excluded any individual with labor market experience 
greater than 3 years, to aVOId using Individuals who may be firmly en-
sconced in the labor force and therefore not competing for a new Job and 
to reduce the potential confounding influence of learning or signaling. 
Second, we excluded observations whose first postschooling Jobs were in 
1982 or 1983, to enhance the comparison between the low-schooling-return 
and high-schooling-return periods and to eliminate severe recession years. 
21 For the nonacademiC test, the OLS estimate (standard error) of the test-score I 
trend Interaction was .0033 ( 0023), and the IV estimate was 0024 (.0077); for the 
academic test the corresponding estimates were .0097 (.0046), and -.0157 (.0175). 
Instrumental variable estimates of the speCification In col. 8 of table 4 (InstrumentIng 
for the test-score van abies but not schooling) also suggest that instrumentIng for 
the test scores reduces (if anything) the estimated change In the return to abtllty 
(for a worker with the average level of education) 
22 For example, consider a worker With an academIC test score 1 standard deviation 
(.857) below the mean (.012), usmg the estimates in col. 8. The annual change m the 
return to schooling for thiS worker IS .0004 + .0029·(- 845) = -.0021 Smce, on 
average, more schoohng IS associated With higher test scores, thiS IS not mconslstent 
With mcreased returns to schoolmg m wage regressions omittIng abihty measures 
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Table 5 
Schooling and Schooling X Abilit~ Coefficients and Trend Interactions 
for Alternative Samples and SpeCifications 
Years of 
EducatIOn 
X Academic 
Test Nonacademic 
X Trend Test Score 
Y ears-of-Educatlon Coefficients Coefficient CoeffiCIent 
Table 2, Col. I Table 4, Col 8 Table 4, Table 4, 
Col 8 Col. 8 
Linear Trend Linear Trend Trend Linear 
OLS estlmates 
Results from earher 
tables 032 .0034 023 0004 0029 061 
( 007) (.0017) ( 009) ( 0020) ( 0010) ( 012) 
Maximum experience 
of 3 years 
(N = 1,888) 034 0041 .027 0008 0045 064 
( 008) ( 0020) (.009) ( 0024) ( 0012) (.012) 
1982 and 1983 
excluded 
(N = 1,823) 030 0036 018 0009 .0026 058 
( 008) ( 0017) ( 009) (.002 I) (001 I) ( 013) 
College graduatlon 
dummy variable 
Included 028 0027 018 - 0001 0030 064 
( 008) ( 0017) ( 009) ( 0020) ( 0010) (.012) 
One-digit Industry 
dummy variables 
Included 
(N = 2,297) 038 0033 028 0009 0023 052 
( 007) (.0016) ( 009) ( 0019) ( 0010) ( 012) 
One-digit occu~atlOn 
dummy varia les 
Included 
(N = 2,297) 029 0013 021 - 0014 .0017 .045 
( 008) (.0017) ( 009) ( 0018) (.0010) ( 012) 
One-digit Industry and 
oecubatlOn dummy 
varia les Included 
(N = 2,297) 032 0016 022 0003 0014 047 
( 007) ( 0016) ( 008) ( 0019) ( 0010) ( 011) 
IV estlmates. 
IV for test scores - 001 0047 - 0005 089 
( 019) ( 0043) ( 0009) ( 075) 
IV for test scores and 
schoohng .035 0039 0018 105 
( 057) ( 0121) ( 0039) (.086) 
IV for schoohng 051 0020 .0053 .067 
( 024) ( 0054) ( 0020) ( 014) 
NOTE -See foornotes m wrrespondmg tables )-4 
Both redefinitions of the sample lead to similar concluslOns as with the 
full sample, with the sample with the maximum-experience restriction 
prOViding a larger estimated increase in the academic test/education in-
teraction effect than was provided by the full sample. 
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Next, we consider alternative wage equation specifications. The fourth 
row of table 5 presents results from estimations that include a college 
graduation dummy; again, conclusions are essentially unchanged. We also 
estimated wage equations that include 12 industry and 11 occupation dum-
mies as regressors; these results are reported in the next three rows of table 
5. These estimates suggest that occupatIOnal shifts (but not Industry shifts) 
can explain a considerable portion of the schooling return Increase If we 
omit ability from the specifications.23 Occupation (and to a lesser extent 
industry) shifts also appear to account for at least part of the increase In 
the interactive effect of academic ability and education, suggestIng that at 
least part of the increased importance of education to wages for high-
academic-ability males is due to demand shifts toward occupations (and 
industries) that tend to employ hlgh-education/hlgh-abllity individuals. 
Finally, we report estimates of the specification reported in column 8 
of table 4, treating the test scores and/or schoolIng as potentially correlated 
with the wage equation error. In the two estimations In which we instru-
ment for the test score variables, the prevIOus finding regarding the Increase 
in the return to schoolIng-that it occurred only for high-ability workers-
is not supported, but the POInt estimate of the education/trend coeffiCIent 
increases (and is marginally significant when we instrument for test scores 
only). However, none of the reported coefficients is statIstically Significant; 
the impreclSJon of these estimates IS not surprising, given the number of 
variables constructed from fitted values based on the same set of exogenous 
varIables. Finally, the last row of the table reports results instrumenting 
for schooling only. Based on the evidence from the Hausman tests In table 
3, schooling is the variable for which the eVidence agaInst exogeneJty is 
strongest. These estimates replicate the OLS estimates in table 4, yielding 
a statistically insignificant (and negative) estImate for the education coef-
ficient trend and a statistically significant positive coeffiCIent for the trend 
in the academic test score / education Interaction. 
IV. Summary 
Much attention has been paid to explaining recent increases In the return 
to schooling among males in the United States. EstImates of these Increases 
are generally obtained from wage regressions that are potentially biased 
by the presence of "unobserved" ability In the wage-equatIon error. Both 
signaling and human-capital models of educatIonal attaInment suggest that 
changes in the relationship between ability and schooling could underlie 
increases in the observed return to schooling. We offer evidence on the 
23 This findmg differs from that of Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990), who 
found that changmg industnal compOSitIOn of employment explams up to 25% of 
the mcrease m education-related earnmgs differentials but that occupational changes 
played no role m the schoolmg-return mcrease 
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plausibility of these explanations, with a particular focus on usmg test 
scores as a proxy for ability 10 wage regressions. Our results provide lIttle 
or no support in favor of the hypothesIs that the increases 10 the return 
to schooling reflect an increased upward bias 10 the schooling coeffiCIent 
estimate due to a change in the abIlity-schooling relationship. But our 
results do provide an interesting refinement of the stylized fact that edu-
cation returns have been increasing in the 1980s-the increase in the return 
to education has occurred only for workers with relatively high levels of 
"academic" ability. This Implies that existing estimates of the increase in 
the return to schooling overstate increases in the true incentive for the 
margmal individual to acquire schooling. 
What can explain an increase 10 the return to education for high-ability 
workers only? Supply-side explanations are plausible. For example, if it 
were the case that education and ability were becoming less correlated 
over time, then there would be relatively fewer of those workers with both 
high levels of education and ability; also, if the average level of ability were 
to fall, this could create a growing scarCIty of high-education, high-ability 
workers. But at present it is difficult to assess the existence or importance 
of such supplY-Side changes.24 While occupatIOn shifts appear to be of 
some importance, what is causmg these shifts is still an open question. 
Skill-biased technical change is one pOSSibIlity, though the evidence in 
favor of thiS argument is stilllimited.25 
Appendix 
Table At 
Individual-Year Schooling Coefficient 
Estimates 
Year CoeffiCIent 
1979 021 (011) 
1980 .048 (011) 
1981 .039 (.011) 
1982 .051 (.012) 
1983 .041 (012) 
1984 .039 (013) 
1985 .062 (015) 
1986 .050 (.015) 
1987 .050 (021) 
NOTE -Standard errors are reported m parcnthe~e~ 
24 In fact, Bishop (1991) refers to results that suggest that average test scores of 
young IndiViduals started to Increase agaIn after 1980. 
25 Krueger (1991) argues that his results are consistent with the technical-change 
hypotheSIS. DaVIS and Haltiwanger ( 1991 ) offer eVidence on changes In wage diS-
persIOn across manufacturing plants that, they argue, supports the skIll-biased 
techmcal-change hypotheSIS. Mincer ( 1991 ) offers time-series eVidence In favor of 
the skIll-bias hypothesis 
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Table A2 
Schooling Coefficient Estimates from 
Test-Score Regressions 
Year AcademIC NonacademIC 
1979 243 (022) 513 (046) 
1980 275 (021) 503 (045) 
1981 .291 (025) 476 (054) 
1982 .278 (020) 401 (042) 
1983 225 (023) 342 (043) 
1984 258 (.022) 347 (044) 
1985 246 (.024) 356 (045) 
1986 191 (020) 249 (.038) 
1987 132 (027) 183 (050) 
NOTE -Standard errors are reported In parentheses 
Table A3 
Coefficients of Instrumental Variables in First-Stage Regressions 
Nonacademic Test' AcademIC Test' 
(I) (2) 
Magazines In home (age 14) .231 149 
(.060) ( 030) 
Newspapers In home (age 14) 311 108 
( 077) ( 038) 
Library card In home (age 14) 067 076 
( 061) ( 030) 
Father's education (1979) 029 015 
( 010) ( 005) 
Mother's education (\ 979) 072 036 
( 013) ( 006) 
Number of siblings (1979) - 047 - 037 
( 019) ( 010) 
Number of older siblings (\ 979) 015 015 
( 024) ( 012) 
Highest grade of oldest sibling 
(\979) 029 012 
( 014) ( 007) 
Foreign language spoken In home 
(age 14) .011 - 052 
( 082) ( 041) 
Father and mother In home (age 14) - 062 - 029 
( 082) ( 040) 
No adult male In home (age 14) - 024 -021 
( 106) (.052) 
R' 368 502 
Schooling 
(3) 
484 
( 073) 
152 
( 095) 
145 
( 075) 
080 
( 012) 
.094 
( 016) 
- 151 
( 022) 
086 
( 029) 
105 
( 017) 
177 
( 100) 
387 
(.100) 
187 
( 130) 
625 
NOTE -Cocfllucnts are reported for first-stage regreso;;H .. lnS usmg lmear "lhoolmg SpeClficatIOns also 
Include Intercepts, SIngle-year dummy >anables, all other vanables Included In speCifications of wage 
equatIons In table 3, and dummy van abies for each varuhle In the table set equal to one when data were 
mISSIng on the Instruments (In which case the vanables were set equal to ?ero) (We distIngUIsh between 
the hIghest grade of oldest SIbling miSSIng In the usual sense and ml"Ing because the respondent IS the 
oldest SIbling) Standard errors are reported In parentheses 
* SpcClfilatIOn mcludes s,-hoolmg and ItS trend mteraltIon 
------------------
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